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REPLY
I.

MS. SNOW WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE $5,000 EXEMPT PROPERTY
CLAIM BECAUSE HER CLAIMS DO NOT CIRCUMVENT THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS AND BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
GIVING NO VALUE TO THE PROPERTY RECEIVED BY MS. SNOW.
A.

MS. SNOW WAS "ENTITLED" TO THE EXEMPT PROPERTY
ALLOWANCE ONLY IF THE CLAIM WAS MADE WITHIN THE
TIME PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY LAW.

Ms. Snow claims that under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-403,
an allowance for exempt property is a right or entitlement
as opposed to a claim.

In support of this, Ms. Snow points

out that the right to exempt property takes u... priority
over all claims" under the statute.
8).

(Appellee's Brief at

While an exempt property allowance may have priority,

this does not mean that an exempt property allowance is not
a claim.

Rather, an exempt property allowance is a priority

claim that is still subject to the statute of limitations
found in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(6), "claims" include
"liabilities of the decedent whether arising in contract, in

tort, or otherwise and liabilities
at or after

the death

of the estate

of the decedent.

which

arise

'Claims' does not

include estate or inheritance taxes, or demands or disputes
regarding title of a decedent or protected person to

1

Under this broad definition of claims, an exempt
property request is a liability of the estate which arises
at the death of the decedent.

An exempt property claim is

not exempted from the statute and it is clearly a liability
or obligation of the estate that arises upon the death of
the decedent.

Therefore, Ms. Snow's right to the exempt

property allowance is a claim subject to the statute of
limitations under section 75-3-803.
Attempting to support her argument, Ms. Snow mistakenly
relies on In Re the Estate of Edward W. Sharp, 537 P.2d 1034
(Utah 1975).

Ms. Snow notes that in Sharp, the Court ruled

that an action for specific performance on a contract is not
included in the definition of a claim.

The Court looked at

the term claim under a prior statute and found that a claim
u

... refers to debts or demands against the Decedent which

might have been enforced in his lifetime, by personal
actions for the recovery of money; and upon which only a
money judgment could have been rendered." Id. at 1037.
Ms. Snow also cites the California case of Parson v.
Parson, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) attempting
to bolster her argument.

There, the California Court of

Appeals stated that "the obligation to pay a family

2

allowance is not a 'liability of the deceased settlor....'
It is an obligation that arises only after death and after
an appropriate order is made." Id. at 689.
Based on the above two cases, Ms. Snow states, u In the
case at hand, the exempt property allowance petitioned for
by Appellee is not a debt or demand against the Decedent
which might have been enforced in his lifetime and
therefore, Appellee's Petition for Exempt Property is not a
claim against the estate.

Thus, Appellant's application of

section 75-3-803 is inappropriate." (Appellee's Brief at
9-10) .
Ms. Snow's reasoning and reliance on the above cases is
flawed.

The Sharp case can easily be distinguished because

it involved an action for specific performance and not an
exempt property claim.

In addition, the Court was

interpreting the term "claim" under an entirely different
statute.

When the Court stated that a claim "refers to

debts or demands against the Decedent which might have been
enforced in his lifetime, by personal actions for the
recovery of money; and upon which only a money judgment
could have been rendered," they obviously were not referring
to the law as it exists today.

3

Under current law, sections 75-3-803 and 75-1-201(6)
both refer to claims which arise at or after the death of
the decedent.

This change in the law clearly makes any

reliance on Sharp or the old statute inapplicable.

Claims

are not restricted to debts or demands which might have been
enforced during the decedent's lifetime.

Rather, because

the new statutes refer to claims as liabilities of the
estate arising at or after the death of the decedent, an
exempt property claim arising at the death of the decedent
is clearly within the statutory definition.
Ms. Snow's reliance on Parson v. Parson is also
unfounded.

Somehow attempting to bolster her claim, she

cites the court's statement that "the obligation to pay a
family allowance is not a 'liability of the deceased
settlor....'

It is an obligation that arises only after

death and after an appropriate order is made."

This

statement is quite true, but it does not lend much support
to Ms. Snow's position.
Ms. Womack is not arguing that the exempt property
claim is a liability of the deceased settlor.

Rather, Ms.

Womack correctly points out that it is a liability of the
estate arising at the death of the settlor.

4

This clearly

complies with our statute and is consistent with the notion
that an exempt property allowance is a claim under section
75-3-803 subject to the three month statute of limitations.
After arguing that section 75-3-803 does not apply, Ms.
Snow also claims even if the statute applies, there is no
three month time limitation applicable to this case.

In

making this argument, Ms. Snow states, "The only three month
statute of limitations contained in section 75-3-803 is
placed on creditors claims made against an estate which are
x

...based on a contract with the personal

representative....'" Here, Ms. Snow is most likely referring
to section 75-3-803(3) (a) .

She goes on to say, "The only

other reference to a three month time limitation is a
portion of the statute which refers to claims made by
creditors made three months after the claims arise."

Here,

Ms. Snow is probably referring to section 75-3-803(3) (b) .
In making these statements, Ms. Snow misstates the law
by inserting the word "creditor" in front of claims in an
attempt to get around the statute.

Section 75-3-803(3)

states, "All claims against a decedent's estate which arise
at or after the death of the decedent...are barred against
the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and

5

devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows: (b)
any other claim within the later of three months after it
arises..."

No where in this section is the word "creditor"

ever used.

However, Ms. Snow conveniently inserts this word

in front of claims attempting to get around the statute.
Ms. Womack does not assert that Ms. Snow is a creditor
and she does not need to be a creditor to fall under this
section.

Rather, if Ms. Snow's petition for exempt property

is a claim that arises at or after the death of the
decedent, the statute of limitations applies.

Because Ms.

Snow's exempt property allowance is a claim under section
75-1-201(6), the three month limitation of section 75-3-803
prohibits Ms. Snow's untimely claim.
Ms. Snow states that if Ms. Womack's position were
granted, heirs of an estate would be required to petition
the estate for their inheritance within the limitations
period.

(Appellee's Brief at 11). This is not true.

An

inheritance is not the same as an exempt property allowance.
The exempt property allowance was created by a specific
statute and is meant to provide a way for a decedent's
family to receive a certain amount of property by law before
the estate is distributed and inheritances are paid.
6

Because of the statutory and technical nature of exempt
property and the fact that it creates a liability for the
estate that is separate from regular distribution, an exempt
property allowance is a claim under Utah law.
Moreover, if Ms. Snow's position were granted, persons
claiming an exempt property allowance could wait for any
period of time before making such a claim.

This is contrary

to the specific requirements of section 75-3-803 and would
frustrate the entire probate process.

The purpose of

section 75-3-803 is to wrap-up the probate of the estate in
as timely a manner as possible.
Allowing family members to wait years before making an
exempt property claim would create large problems in
administering an estate.

Section 75-3-803 provides for a

three month period where these types of claims must be filed
in order to proceed with the administration and closing of
an estate.

Permitting an exempt property claim years down

the road would cause an unnecessary interruption in the
process or a re-opening of the process for an indefinite
period.

This is not only illogical and burdensome, it is

also contrary to law.

7

B.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RELY ON MS. WOMACK'S
ACCOUNTING IN DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ASSETS
PASSING TO MS. SNOW, BUT RATHER ASSUMED THAT THE
PROPERTY HAD NO VALUE WHEN MS. WOMACK#S INVENTORY
STATED THE VALUE WAS UNKNOWN.

Ms. Snow claims that "Appellant, as Personal
Representative, supplied the Trial Court with an Inventory,
sworn to be true and correct, under oath, that the personal
effects of the Decedent had no value."
12).

This is incorrect.

(Appellee's Brief at

Ms. Womack's Inventory stated that

the value of the personal effects was unknown.

Because it

was unknown, it was not included in the total value of the
estate. (R. 116-120).

Ms. Snow goes on to say, "Appellee

has never disputed this, nor has Appellant ever filed any
document under oath disputing the Inventory." (Appellee's
Brief at 12).
Ms. Womack has never filed any document under oath
disputing the Inventory because the Inventory is correct
where it states that the value of the personal property is
unknown.

Ms. Womack, in her Motion for Summary Judgment

filed November 26, 1999, points out that there is at least
some value to the personal property in that it contained
crystal pieces, electronic equipment, furniture, jewelry,
and oil painting and personal property.
8

(R. 291-373).

Ms. Womack was prevented from appraising these items
because they were already distributed to Ms. Snow once the
dispute arose.

Despite this, the trial court failed to

attribute any value to these items and allowed the entire
$5,000 exempt property claim in violation of the off-setting
requirements for exempt property found in section 75-2-403.
Clearly, a factual dispute remains as to the value of
the personal property.

Ms. Snow claims that the property

has no value, undoubtedly to keep the entire $5,000 exempt
property claim erroneously awarded by the Trial Court.

Ms.

Womack, using common sense and the Inventory she filed with
the Trial Court, maintains that the property has some value,
cilthough the exact value is unknown.

Because the Trial

Court decided this case on Summary Judgment, without an
€>videntiary hearing to determine the value of the exempt
property, the Trial Court abused its discretion and
committed plain error by granting summary judgment where
issues of fact remained undecided.

Therefore, this Court

should remand the case for a determination of the value of
this property.
II.

DESPITE MS. SNOW'S CLAIMS, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING MS. SNOW'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF FIVE KEY PROVISIONS IN
THE TRUST.
9

A.

BECAUSE THE TRUST AMENDMENT DISTRIBUTES ALL OF THE
DECEDENT'S ESTATE TO MS. WOMACK, THE LIFE ESTATE
MERGES WITH THE REMAINDER AND MS. SNOW SHOULD
RECEIVE THE ESTATE IN FEE SIMPLE.

Ms. Snow claims that "where a Trust or Will uses
dispositive language limiting or defining the interest to
coincide with the life of the person, or other events, and
no absolute disposition is given of the complete interest in
the estate or trust, Courts have routinely construed such
dispositions to convey limited interests or life estates."
While Ms. Snow gives no citations to support this statement,
Ms. Womack agrees that this is an accurate statement of
existing law.

In this case, both sides agree that the

decedent used language creating a life estate for Ms.
Womack.

However, the two sides disagree concerning the

distribution of the remainder interest.
Ms. Snow contends that despite the fact that the
Amendment erases the specific mention of her as a
beneficiary, she is still entitled to the remainder interest
under the previous trust.

Not only does the Amendment

eliminate any mention of Ms. Snow as a beneficiary, it
grants a remainder interest to Ms. Womack creating a merger
of the life estate into a fee simple as Ms. Womack is the
sole remainder beneficiary.
10

The new language in the Amendment granting a remainder
interest to Ms. Womack states, "The remainder of the trust
estate shall be held in trust to provide Ruby Womack with
income.

Ruby shall have complete discretion in the use of

the trust estate." (R. 26). Because Ms. Womack has complete
discretion in the use of the trust estate to provide herself
with income, she has the ability to use all of the remainder
as she chooses.

This creates a fee simple absolute and the

life estate is merged providing the entire estate to Ms.
Womack pursuant to this Amendment.
Ms. Snow claims that because the Trust Amendment does
not specifically revoke the previous trust and because the
Amendment is not entirely inconsistent with the trust, the
trust and Amendment must be read together.

While we agree

that the Amendment does not specifically revoke the prior
trust and that the Amendment is not entirely inconsistent
with the trust, we disagree with Ms. Snow concerning certain
inconsistencies between the two documents.
Ms. Snow claims that there is no inconsistency between
Article VII, paragraph 1 of the trust and paragraph 1 of the
Trust Amendment.

(Appellee's Brief at 20). We disagree.

Article VII, paragraph 1 of the trust specifically grants

11

Ms. Snow a remainder interest in the mobile home. (R. 17).
Paragraph 1 of the Trust Amendment takes away that remainder
interest and goes on to say, uThe remainder of the trust
estate shall be held in trust to provide Ruby Womack with
income.

Ruby shall have complete discretion in the use of

the trust estate." (R. 26).
The above provisions are inconsistent because the Trust
Amendment revokes the remainder interest for Ms. Snow by
eliminating any mention of her remainder interest and
granting that interest to Ms. Womack.

Ms. Snow relies on

the statement that the "remainder of the trust estate shall
be held in trust..." to say that there is no way the
decedent could have intended to leave the remainder to Ms.
Womack because he would have given it outright rather than
keeping it in trust.

This is not necessarily true.

The Decedent intended to leave the remainder to Ms.
Womack to provide her with income in her complete
discretion, as stated in the Amendment.

Simply because the

remainder was held in trust does not mean that Ms. Snow is
automatically the beneficiary because of a previous trust.
By creating a trust, the Decedent obviously appreciated the
value of such an instrument and recognized that keeping the

12

property in trust for the absolute benefit of Ms. Womack was
a prudent approach.
Because the Trust Amendment is inconsistent with the
original trust concerning the remainder beneficiary, the
original trust is superseded by the Amendment and its
provisions prevail.

Therefore, Ms. Womack is the sole

beneficiary and should be granted a fee simple in the
Decedent's estate.
B.

THE WORD *INCOME" MUST BE READ IN CONTEXT AND A
DETERMINATION OF THE DECEDENT'S INTENT IS
ESSENTIAL IN RESOLVING ANY AMBIGUITY OVER THIS
TERM.

Ms. Snow is correct in asserting that the word income
is statutorily defined in Section 22-3-4(1) as "...the
return in money or property derived from the use of
principal...."

She is also correct in pointing out that

this term is used numerous times in the trust to coincide
with the above definition.

However, to determine the

meaning of the word "income," as used in the Trust
Amendment, the word must be read in context.
When the Decedent stated, "The remainder of the trust
estate shall be held in trust to provide
income,"

RuJby Womack with

the word income takes on a new meaning because of

13

the context.

The word income is modified when the words

provide" are placed in front of it.

u

to

When Ms. Snow refers to

the word income throughout the trust to mean interest
generated from principal, Ms. Snow never mentions a
situation where the words "to provide" are placed in front
of income.

Common sense dictates that when a person uses

the words, "to provide income," they are referring to
support rather than the more technical, statutory definition
of interest from principal.
Because both definitions of the word income are
plausible, an ambiguity exists and extrinsic evidence should
have been allowed to determine the Decedent's intent in
using this word.
(Utah 1991).

Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104

At the very least, the Trial Court should have

looked to the surrounding circumstances at the time the
trust was created to assist in determining the Decedent's
intent.

Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797 (Utah 1974).

Ms. Snow claims that Ms. Womack mistakenly relies on
Makoff in support of the theory that extrinsic evidence
should be used to determine the Decedent's intent.

However,

as stated by this court in Makoff v. Makoff, "...in
ascertaining the intention of the settlor we may consider

14

the entire instrument aided by the surrounding circumstances
at the time of creation of the trust." Id. at 798.

In

Makoff, the Court looked to surrounding circumstances to aid
in interpreting the word "issue."

In this case, the Trial

Court failed to consider any of the surrounding
circumstances in interpreting the word income.
The surrounding circumstances in this case show that
the Decedent was living with Ms. Womack and providing her
with income for her living expenses.

This supports Ms.

Womack's interpretation of the word income to mean continued
financial support, not interest generated from principal in
the amount of approximately $300 per year.

Ms. Snow claims

that if Ms. Womack would have left all of the principal
intact, the trust would have generated more income.

While

this is true, the income generated from this principal would
still be far less than the income the Decedent was providing
to the Ms. Womack before his death.
Another surrounding circumstance that the Trial Court
failed to consider was the relationship between the Decedent
and Ms. Snow.

In the period between the execution of the

original trust instrument and the Amendment, the
relationship between the Decedent and Ms. Snow became very

15

soured and estranged.

This supports the notion that when

the Decedent eliminated any reference to Ms. Snow as a
remainder beneficiary, Decedent intended to disinherit her
based on their poor relationship.
Many decedents wish to leave the decision of whether to
include others in the inheritance to a main recipient such
as Ms. Womack in this case.

This frees the decedent of the

guilt and responsibility of specifically disinheriting
someone.

It also gives the recipient the opportunity to

make gifts to that person if relations between the parties
improve over time.

This is supported by the surrounding

circumstances as well as the language in the Amendment
giving Ms. Womack complete discretion in the use of the
trust estate.
Had the Trial Court looked to the surrounding
circumstances in interpreting the word income, a far
different result would have been reached and the Decedent's
true intent would have been determined.

Because of the

Trial Court's failure to consider surrounding circumstances,
this Court should remand the case for a determination of
these circumstances and a judgment consistent with these
requirements.

16

C.

MS. WOMACK'S EXCEPTIONALLY BROAD POWERS UNDER THE
TRUST ENTITLED HER TO MOVE THE MOBILE HOME.

Ms. Snow claims that the language in the Trust
Amendment stating, "Ruby shall have complete discretion in
the use of the trust estate" is merely a re-statement of
section 75-7-402.

However, the above provision makes no

reference to this statute and no where in the statute does
it give a trustee complete discretion in the use of the
trust estate.

Rather, the Decedent was intending to give

Ms. Womack broader powers than those outlined in the
statute.
discretion

In fact, the Decedent gave Ms. Womack

"complete

in the use of the trust estate" as expressed in

the document itself.
This broad grant of authority clearly entitles Ms.
Womack to move the mobile home.

Even if the court

determines that she is merely an income beneficiary, she is
entitled to make expenditures of trust principal.

Because

she has complete discretion in the use of the trust estate
(both income and principal), she is entitled to make such
expenditures.

Undoubtedly, one of the key purposes of the

trust was to provide for Ms. Womack.

By moving the mobile

home closer to her family to support her care, Ms. Womack

17

has furthered the purpose of the trust.
D.

DESPITE MS. WOMACK'S BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE
TRUST, SHE IS STILL ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
FOR PERFORMING HER DUTIES AS TRUSTEE.

Ms. Snow assumes that because there is a dispute in
this case concerning beneficiaries, Ms. Womack's attorneys
fees should not be paid based on Estate of Ashton v. Ashton
(Ashton II). 898 P.2d 824 (Utah Ct. App.).

In Ashton II,

the personal representative was seeking to have her
attorney's fees paid from the estate where her fees were
incurred in her role as claimant as opposed to personal
representative.
Ashton II can be distinguished from the case at hand
because at least some of Ms. Womack's fees have been
incurred in her role as trustee.

Unlike Ashton II, this

case involves more than a determination of heirs.

This case

involves several issues, including a determination of
whether Ms. Womack was justified in denying Ms. Snow's
exempt property claim and whether Ms. Womack was within her
rights, as

trustee,

to take certain actions.

In addition to the Utah cases supporting the
reimbursement of attorney's fees for counsel in
administering trusts (see Appellant's Brief at 21-24),
18

California law provides broad support for this as well.
Under California law, the trustee may use trust funds to pay
for legal advice regarding trust administration and may
recover attorneys fees incurred in successfully defending
against claims of the beneficiaries; when the law gives
these rights, the funds do not in law belong to the
beneficiaries.

Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 990 P.2d

591 (Cal. 2000) .
Based on the above factors, at the very least the Court
should remand the case for a determination of what portions
of Ms. Womack's attorney's fees were based on her duties as
trustee as opposed to her role as claimant.
E.

THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE TRUST, INCLUDING THE
BROAD AUTHORITY GRANTED TO MS. WOMACK TO USE THE
TRUST ASSETS IN HER COMPLETE DISCRETION, ALLOWED
MS. WOMACK TO PAY-OFF THE ENCUMBRANCE ON THE
DECEDENTS VAN.

Ms. Snow contends that the language in the trust
directing the trustee to pay all expenses in administering
the trust was not enough to allow Ms. Womack to pay-off the
encumbrance on the van.

However, Ms. Snow fails to read

this provision of the trust (Article VIII, paragraph C) in
connection with the Amendment stating, "Ruby shall have
complete discretion in the use of the trust estate."
19

These

two provisions read together provide Ms. Womack with the
authority to pay-off the encumbrance and overcome the rule
of construction against exoneration.
III. MS. SNOW'S ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN AWAY THE AMBIGUITIES
FOUND IN THE TRUST AND AMENDMENT FAIL UNDER CLOSER
ANALYSIS.
Ms. Snow's first attempt at explaining away the
ambiguities in the trust and Amendment is to argue that the
alternative definition of income posited by Ms. Womack is
"fatally deficient."

(Appellee's Brief at 38). Ms. Snow

argues that simply because Ms. Womack can "imagine" a new
definition for the word income,
ambiguity.

this does not create an

However, as this Court determined in Makoff v.

Makoff, two reasonable interpretations of the same word may
create ambiguity such that surrounding circumstances should
be considered in determining the decedent's intent.

528

P.2d 797 (Utah 1974) (finding ambiguity concerning the
meaning of the word "issue").
In this case, where the ambiguity lies in the meaning
of the word "income," Ms. Snow fails to consider the merits
of Ms. Womack's position.

Rather than considering the fact

that Ms. Womack's definition of the word income is not only
valid, but more consistent with the surrounding
20

circumstances, Ms. Snow simply blinds herself to the merits
and claims t \t the statutory definition must prevail,
despite the context or the Decedent's intent.
This appeared to be the Trial Court's approach as well.
Because of this and other ambiguities, the Trial Court
should have allowed extrinsic evidence or at least
surrounding circumstances to determine the Decedent's intent
rather than frustrating the entire purpose of the trust.
This court should remand this case for a determination of
the Decedent's intent rather than affirming a judgment based
on only Ms. Snow's interpretation of the Decedent's intent.
Ms. Snow also argues that there is no ambiguity
relating to the word "remainder."

However, Ms. Snow

overlooks the ambiguity that lies at the heart of this
dispute.

Because the Decedent eliminated Ms. Snow as a

specific remainder beneficiary in the Amendment, an
ambiguity arises as to who the remainder beneficiary is
under the Amendment.

Ms. Womack argues that because of the

language granting a remainder interest to her for income
with complete discretion, it is more likely that the
Decedent intended her to be the beneficiary rather than the
now excluded Ms. Snow.
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However, there may be some ambiguity on this issue
because the Decedent failed to specifically authorize a
remainder interest outside of the devise to Ms. Womack.

Ms.

Snow's argument that the fall-back position should be to the
original trust where she was a beneficiary is only one
interpretation.

Ms. Womack's position that the Decedent

intended to make her the remainder beneficiary is also very
plausible.

Therefore, an ambiguity exists and extrinsic

evidence or surrounding circumstances should be viewed to
determine the Decedent's intent.

In the Matter of the

Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Ms. Snow attempts to distinguish the case of Estate of
Ashton v. Ashton (Ashton I) based on the fact that Ashton I
involved an apparent ambiguity where this case involves a
latent ambiguity. 804 P.2d 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Regardless of whether the ambiguity is latent or apparent,
the Decedent's intent and surrounding circumstances should
be considered.

To avoid a result that is clearly contrary

to the Decedent's intent in setting up the instrument, it is
crucial to look to surrounding circumstances and even
extrinsic evidence when ambiguities exist.

This should be

the approach taken by the Court in the case at hand
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concerning the ambiguous provisions.
CONCLUSION
The trial court made several mistakes of law that
should be overturned by this court and the case remanded for
further determinations of fact.

First, the court erred in

granting Ms. Snow's exempt property claim.

Second, the

court erred in interpreting several provisions of the trust,
including the remainder interests of the parties, definition
of income, trustee's discretion and ability to pay debts, as
well as attorney's fees.

Third, the trial court should have

considered the intent of the decedent in interpreting
ambiguous provisions in the trust.

Based on the above

factors, this court should reverse and remand this case for
further proceedings and fact-finding consistent with
governing law.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of October, 2001.

AiKhch^.
Robyn Rofoe Walton, #8261
ROWE & WALTON, P.C.
915 South Main Street
Bountiful, UT 84010
Counsel for Ms. Womack
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